

Op-12-CTH(SC)A16(B-S) Serial 014412

NAVY DEPARTMENT,  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,  
Washington, 10 February 1941.

*Secret*

From: The Chief of Naval Operations.

To: The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: Chief of Naval Operations Plan D.

References: (a) Case, U. S. Pacific Fleet, secret ltr. A16/0129 of January 25, 1941.

(b) SecNav secret ltr. to SecWar, Serial 00112 of January 24, 1941.

1. Receipt is acknowledged of reference (a).

2. Since the plans to be prepared under the directives of WPL-41 will be applicable to a large extent to the situation presented by Plan D, the Chief of Naval Operations desires that planning under WPL-41 continue to have the highest priority.

3. The general concept, the assumptions, and the tasks under a Plan D situation, outlined in paragraphs 3, 4, and 5 of reference (a), are in accord with the views of the Chief of Naval Operations.

4. In connection with the tidal sweep for Japanese raiders in the Northern Pacific, mentioned in paragraph 5 (7), a suggestion may here be in order. The Chief of Naval Operations believes it possible that Japan for some time maintained a vessel about 500 miles north of Oahu. Indications are that some similar vessel is now stationed about 1,000 miles southwest of Oahu, in connection with reports of unidentified submarines near Oahu, Fanning, the Mexican coast, and in the open sea, it may be assumed that the vessel mentioned above is a submarine tender, and that Japan may plan during war to base submarines on tenders in the open sea. It is considered most inadvisable that we indicate too much curiosity in this respect for the time being. It would be well, however, to keep track of such vessels, and to take immediate steps to sink them on the outbreak of war.

5. With reference to paragraph 7 of reference (a), the Chief of Naval Operations is cognizant of the condition of the defenses of Oahu, and, in view of the inadequacy of the Army defenses, the responsibility which must rest upon the fleet for its own protection while in Pearl Harbor. In this connection, your attention is invited to reference (b), a copy of which was furnished to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet. The War Department is taking steps to remedy the situation, but the Commander-in-Chief should constantly press the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department to make all the improvements that lie within his own power.

6. It is noted that no provision is made in the Naval local Defense Force plans of the Fourteenth Naval District for the employment of vessels as a part of an aircraft warning net in the waters to the northward and southward of Oahu. It is suggested that in coordinating the plans of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, and the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, this matter be given consideration. It is possible the large transports equipped with radio might prove useful for this purpose during war.

7. The urgency of delivery of this document is such that it will not reach the addressee in time by the next available officer courier. The originator therefore authorizes the transmission of this document by registered mail.

/s/ H. K. Stark  
H. K. STARK

## EXHIBIT NO. 10

Op-12H-9-McC (SC)A7-2(2)/FFI

Serial 00112

*Secret*

JAN. 24, 1941.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The security of the U. S. Pacific Fleet while in Pearl Harbor, and of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base itself, has been under renewed study by the Navy Department and forces abroad for the past several weeks. This reexamination has been, in part, prompted by the increased gravity of the situation with respect to Japan, and by reports from abroad of successful bombing and torpedo plane attacks on ships while in losses. If war eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily possible that hostilities would be

initiated by a surprise attack upon the Fleet or the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor.

In my opinion, the inherent possibilities of a major disaster to the fleet or naval base warrant taking every step, as rapidly as can be done, that will increase the joint readiness of the Army and Navy to withstand a raid of the character mentioned above.

The dangers envisaged in their order of importance and probability are considered to be:

- (1) Air bombing attack.
- (2) Air torpedo plane attack.
- (3) Sabotage.
- (4) Submarine attack.
- (5) Mining.
- (6) Bombardment by gun fire.

Defense against all but the first two of these dangers appears to have been provided for satisfactorily. The following paragraphs are devoted principally to a discussion of the problems encompassed in (1) and (2) above, the solution of which I consider to be of primary importance.

Both types of air attack are possible. They may be carried out successively, simultaneously, or in combination with any of the other operations enumerated. The maximum probable enemy effort may be put at twelve aircraft squadrons, and the minimum at two. Attacks would be launched from a striking force of carriers and their supporting vessels.

[2] The counter measures to be considered are:

- (a) Location and engagement of enemy carriers and supporting vessels before air attack can be launched;
- (b) Location and engagement of enemy aircraft before they reach their objectives;
- (c) Repulse of enemy aircraft by anti-aircraft fire;
- (d) Concealment of vital installations by artificial smoke;
- (e) Protection of vital installations by balloon barrages.

The operations set forth in (a) are largely functions of the Fleet but, quite possibly, might not be carried out in case of an air attack initiated without warning prior to a declaration of war.

Pursuit aircraft in large numbers and an effective warning net are required for the operations in (b). It is understood that only thirty-six Army pursuit aircraft are at present in Oahu, and that, while the organization and equipping of an Anti-Air Information Service supported by modern fire control equipment is in progress, the present system relies wholly on visual observation and sound locators which are only effective up to four miles.

Available Army anti-aircraft batteries appear inadequate if judged by the standards of the war in Europe. There are now in Oahu 26—3" fixed anti-aircraft guns (of which something over half are grouped about Pearl Harbor), 56 mobile 3" guns, and 109 .50 caliber machine guns. The anti-aircraft batteries are manned in part by personnel which is also required to man parts of the sea coast artillery. Should an attack on Oahu combine air attack with a gun bombardment, one or the other countering fires would suffer from lack of men. If the prevailing high ceiling is taken into account the caliber of the anti-aircraft guns might be inadequate against high altitude bombing attack.

By late summer the defenses will be considerably strengthened by additions in guns, planes, and radio locators. It is understood, sixteen additional 3" Mobile, twenty-four 90 mm., and one hundred twenty 37 mm. guns will be on hand; the pursuit aircraft strength is to be expanded to a total of 149; the new radio locators will have an effective range of 100 miles. Although the caliber of the guns will still be small for effective action against high altitude bombers, this augmentation will markedly improve the security of the Fleet. It does not, of course, affect the critical period immediately before us.

[3] The supplementary measures noted in (d) and (e) might be of the greatest value in the defense of Pearl Harbor. Balloon barrages have demonstrated some usefulness in Europe. Smoke from fixed installations on the ground might prove most advantageous.

To meet the needs of the situation, I offer the following proposals:

(1) That the Army assign the highest priority to the increase of pursuit aircraft and anti-aircraft artillery, and the establishment of an air warning net in Hawaii.

(2) That the Army give consideration to the questions of balloon barrages, the employment of smoke, and other special devices for improving the defenses of Pearl Harbor.

(3) That local joint plans be drawn for the effective coordination of naval and military aircraft operations, and ship and shore anti-aircraft gun fire, against surprise aircraft raids.

(4) That the Army and Navy forces in Oahu agree on appropriate degrees of joint readiness for immediate action in defense against surprise aircraft raids against Pearl Harbor.

(5) That joint exercises, designed to prepare Army and Navy forces in Oahu for defense against surprise aircraft raids, be held at least once weekly so long as the present uncertainty continues to exist.

Your concurrence in these proposals and the rapid implementing of the measures to be taken by the Army, which are of the highest importance to the security of the Fleet, will be met with the closest cooperation on the part of the Navy Department.

Sincerely yours,

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*Secretary of the Navy.*

The Honorable The SECRETARY OF WAR.

Copies to: CINC, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Com 14

Op-22

Op-30



## WAR DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON

FEB 7, 1941

Subject: Air Defense of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.

To: The Secretary of the Navy.

1. In replying to your letter of January 24, regarding the possibility of surprise attacks upon the Fleet or the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor, I wish to express complete concurrence as to the importance of this matter and the urgency of our making every possible preparation to meet such a hostile effort. The Hawaiian Department is the best equipped of all our overseas departments, and continues to hold a high priority for the completion of its projected defenses because of the importance of giving full protection to the Fleet.

2. The Hawaiian Project provides for one hundred and forty-eight pursuit planes. There are now in Hawaii thirty-six pursuit planes; nineteen of these are P-36's and seventeen are of somewhat less efficiency. I am arranging to have thirty-one P-36 pursuit planes assembled at San Diego for shipment to Hawaii within the next ten days, as agreed to with the Navy Department. This will bring the Army pursuit group in Hawaii up to fifty of the P-36 type and seventeen of a somewhat less efficient type. In addition, fifty of the new P-40-B pursuit planes, with their guns, leakproof tanks and modern armor will be assembled at San Diego about March 15 for shipment by carrier to Hawaii.


3. There are at present in the Hawaiian Islands eighty-two 3-inch AA guns, twenty 37 mm AA guns (en route), and one hundred and nine caliber .50 AA machine guns. The total project calls for ninety-eight 3-inch AA guns, one hundred and twenty 37 mm AA guns, and three hundred and eight caliber .50 AA machine guns.

4. With reference to the Aircraft Warning Service, the equipment therefor has been ordered and will be delivered in Hawaii in June. All arrangements for installation will have been made by the time the equipment is delivered. Inquiry develops the information that delivery of the necessary equipment cannot be made at an earlier date.

SECRET

5. The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, is being directed to give immediate consideration to the question of the employment of balloon barrages and the use of smoke in protecting the Fleet and base facilities. Barrage balloons are not available at the present time for installation and cannot be made available prior to the summer of 1941. At present there are three on hand and eighty-four being manufactured -- forty for delivery by June 30, 1941, and the remainder by September. The Budget now has under consideration funds for two thousand nine hundred and fifty balloons. The value of smoke for screening vital areas on Oahu is a controversial subject. Qualified opinion is that atmospheric and geographic conditions in Oahu render the employment of smoke impracticable for large scale screening operations. However, the Commanding General will look into this matter again.

6. With reference to your other proposals for joint defense, I am forwarding a copy of your letter and this reply to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and am directing him to cooperate with the local naval authorities in making those measures effective.

  
Secretary of War.

(2-8-41)

Op-12B-McC (SC) A7-2 (2)/FF1

Serial 015712

D-27446

*Secret*

FEB. 11, 1941.

From: The Chief of Naval Operations.

To: The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

The Commandant, FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT.

Subject: Air Defense of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.

Reference: (a) SecNav Secret Let. to SecWar, (SC) A7-2 (2)/FF1, Serial 09112 of January 24, 1941.

Enclosure: (A) Copy of SecWar Secret Let. to SecNavy dated February 7, 1941 in reply to reference (a).

1. In connection with reference (a), a copy of which was forwarded to you, there is forwarded herewith as Enclosure (A), a copy of the reply of the Secretary of War to reference (a).

Copy to: Op-22

Op-30

*Via Air Mail*

FEBRUARY 7, 1941.

Subject: Air Defense of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.

To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

1. Attention is invited to the inclosed copy of letter from the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of War of January 24, 1941, relative to the above mentioned subject, together with copy of reply thereto from the Secretary of War, February 7, 1941.

2. It is desired that you cooperate with the local naval authorities in making effective the measures for joint defense, referred to in paragraph 6 of the reply to the Secretary of the Navy.

By order of the Secretary of War:

WM. W. DICK,  
*Adjutant General,*  
Reg. No. 900270, 2-8-41.

2 Inclosures—

Inc. 1—Copy, ltr. from Sec. of Navy to Sec. of War, 1-2-41.

Incl. 2—Copy, ltr. from Sec. of War to Sec. of Navy, 2-7-41.

13 FEB. 1941.

Subject: A. dse. o. ph. hwi.

Received of The Adjutant General, letter, February 7, 1941, subject as indicated above, together with two (2) inclosures noted therein.

(Signed) Carl Grosse,  
CARL GROSSE,*Major, A. G. D., Assistant Adjutant General,*  
*Office: Headquarters, Hawaiian Department.*

[Stamped notation: 45 AGO Feb 24 1941 Received]

NOTE: Please accomplish promptly and return to The A. G. O.